Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Roland Webb v. ROA General Inc., a Utah
corporation, William Reagan, individually, and
Douglas T. Hall, individually : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Philip R. Fishler; Stephen J. Trayner; Strong & Hanni; Attorney for appellant Reagan; Douglas T.
Tall; Attorney for Appellant ROA;
Val J. Christensen; Stephen M. Tumblin; LeBouef, Lamb, Leiby & McRae; Attorneys for
Respondent Webb.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Webb v. ROA General, No. 890170 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1704

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

!"

• U

.A10
DOCKET NO.

W.cjo^

IN THE COURT Or J \ P P E A L S OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROLAND WEBB,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, WILLIAM
REAGAN, individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL,
individually,

No. 890170-CA
Priority No. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLAND WEBB
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE
VAL J. CHRISTENSEN, #3923
STEPHEN M. TUMBLIN, #5154
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 355-6900
Attorneys for Respondent Webb
PHILIP R. FISHLER
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-7080
Attorneys for Appellant Reagan
DOUGLAS T. HALL
1775 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
(801) 521-1775
Attorney for Appellant R.O.A.

FILED
OCT 131989
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND WEBB,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, WILLIAM
REAGAN, individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL,
individually,

No. 890170-CA
Priority No. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLAND WEBB

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The present appeal is based on the interpretation of an employment contract.
There are no statutes or rules that are determinative of the issues in this case.
DATED this 13th day of October, 1989.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae

Stephen M.^mblin

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND WEBB,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

]

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, WILLIAM
REAGAN, individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL,
individually,
Defendants-Appellants.

])
]
]
;I
]

No. 890170-CA
Priority No. 14b

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLAND WEBB
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE
VAL J. CHRISTENSEN, #3923
STEPHEN M. TUMBLIN, #5154
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 355-6900
Attorneys for Respondent Webb
PHILIP R. FISHLER
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-7080
Attorneys for Appellant Reagan
DOUGLAS T. HALL
1775 North 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
(801) 521-1775
Attorney for Appellant R.O.A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENTS

7

POINT I:
POINT II:

R.O.A.'s Numerous and Uncontroverted Admissions of
Liability Are Sufficient to Warrant Summary Judgment
Parole Evidence is Inadmissible to Change the Terms of the
Employment Agreement

7
11

POINT III: Webb Did Not Waive His Right to Receive Compensation
Under the Agreement

14

CONCLUSION

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist,
21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968)

15

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225
(Utah 1987)

12

Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co..
27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972)

12

B.T. Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corp., 82 Utah 316,
24 P.2d 384 (1933)

14

Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892
(Utah 1988)

12

Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261,
501 P.2d 266 (1972)

13

Buxton v. Diversified Resources Corporation, 634 F.2d
1313 (10th Cir. 1980)

9

City of Houston v. Moodv. 572 S.W.2d 13
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978)

9

Courtney v. Courtney. 542 P.2d 164 (Alaska 1975)

8

Falker v. Samperi. 461 A.2d 681 (Conn. 1983)

8

Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983)

12

Hal Taylor Ass, v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743
(Utah 1982)

14

Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983)
In re Marriage of Brooks. 742 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App. 1987)

\ 15
7

Jones v. Hinckle. 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980)

13

Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)

12

Manlin v. Manlin. 638 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. App. 1982)

10

Oxlev v. Linton Plywood Ass'n. 284 P.2d 767 (Ore. 1955)
-ii-

8

Stee v. "L" Monte Industries. Inc.. 247 N.W.2d 641
(N.D. 1976)

10

Tomino v. Greater Park City Co.. 570 P.2d 698
(Utah 1977)

14

Tvler Gilman Corp. v. Williams. 221 S.E.2d 129
(Vir. 1976)

9

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981)
Webb v. R.O.A. General. Inc. 773 P.2d 834
(Utah App. 1989)
Wingets. Inc. v. Bitters. 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1972)
Woodstock Enterprises. Inc. v. International Mooring
and Marine. Inc.. 524 So.2d 1313 (La. App. 1988)

12
1, 15
14
7

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)

1

Utah R. Evidence 801(d)(2)

7

Wigmore on Evidence § 1073 (Chadbourne Rev. 1972)

8

Williston on Contracts. § 633, p. 1016 (1961)

-iii-

13

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND WEBB,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, WILLIAM
REAGAN, individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL,
individually,

No. 890170-CA
Priority No. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLAND WEBB
Roland Webb ("Webb") respectfully submits this brief in response to the
brief filed on behalf of appellants R.O.A. General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), William Reagan
("Reagan") and Douglas T. Hall (collectively "Appellants").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was the district court correct in finding, as a matter of law, that
Webb's compensation under his employment agreement with R.O.A. was due and
owing?
2. Did the district court correctly find that the employment agreement
between Webb and R.O.A. was integrated and not ambiguous and therefore properly
refuse to permit extrinsic evidence concerning its interpretation?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was previously before this Court for the purpose of enforcing
Webb's shareholder rights of inspection pursuant to Section 16-10-47(b) Utah Code
Annotated (1953). See Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc. 773 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989).

-1-

In the present appeal, R.O.A. seeks to overturn the summary decision of the Third
Judicial District for Salt Lake County ordering R.O.A. to pay to Webb his accrued
compensation of $342,747.00 under the employment agreement between Webb and
R.O.A. (R. 966-70)
The following facts were not disputed by R.O.A. in the summary
judgment proceedings below.
1.

Since 1981, Webb has owned 20% of the stock of R.O.A. in joint

tenancy with his wife. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Webb was a member of the
Board of Directors of R.O.A. and was also an employee of R.O.A. (R. 797; R. 518)
2*

Defendant Reagan is the president and the majority shareholder of

R.O.A., owning 80% of the stock. Reagan is also a member of the Board of Directors
of R.O.A. (R. 797)
3.

On or about July 1, 1981, in connection with the merger of Galaxy

Outdoor Advertising and R.O.A., Webb entered into an Employment Agreement with
R.O.A. (the "Agreement") whereby R.O.A. employed Webb as Chairman of the Board
of Directors and Vice President of R.OA, commencing August 1, 1981 and continuing
until August 1, 1986. (R. 695-697) The Agreement provided, among other things, that
Webb would receive annual base compensation of $100,000 ("Base Compensation") plus
additional compensation equal to one percent (1%) of the annual net sales of outdoor
advertising of R.O.A. ("Additional Compensation"). (R. 695)
4.

Under the Agreement, Webb's duties were to include only those

specific services requested of him by the Board of Directors of R.O.A. (R. 695)
Section 6 of the Agreement provides that R.O.A. "may not terminate this Agreement
for any reason other than fraud or gross malfeasance." (R. 695) The Agreement
further provides that "the compensation which we have agreed upon for the five year
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period is non-cancellable for any reason including death . . . ." (R. 700) The
Agreement states that it was expected that Webb would devote the following
percentages of his time to R.O.A.:

5.

1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year

50%
25%
12!/2%
7!/2%

5th year

5%

Webb acted as Chairman of the Board and as Vice President

during the entire term of the Agreement. (R. 691)
6.

R.O.A. has not disputed that the minutes of meetings and actions

of the board of directors of R.O.A. during the term of the Agreement contain no
request whatsoever that Webb perform any services for R.O.A. which were not fully
and promptly performed. (R. 798)
7.

The audited financial statements and financial records of R.O.A.

for each of the five years of the Agreement state that Webb earned, but did not
receive, compensation in the following amounts:
Total
Due*
1st Year
2nd Year
3rd Year
4th Year
5th Year

Cash
Paid

Trades
Paid

Total
Paid

Amount
Accrued

$130,696
134,715
138,401
141,721
142,671

$ 86,051
86,524
88,456
58,517
2,255

$ 6,256
2,158
3,614
616
-0-

$ 92,307
88,682
92,070
59,133
2,255

$ 38,389
46,033
46,331
82,588
140,416

$688,204

$312,644

$12,644

$334,447

$353,757

$ 11,010

$342,747

Subsequent
Payment

This figure includes $100,000 Base Compensation and Additional Compensation of
1% of net sales as calculated by R.O.A.
(R. 702)
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8.

Due to R.O.A.'s cash flow problems, on March 14, 1985, William
*

Reagan, Norman W. Clark, and Gerald Gray, who constituted a majority of the board
of directors of R.O.A., voted in favor of and passed a resolution imposing a
moratorium on the payment of Webb's compensation, effective April 1, 1985. Webb
voted against this resolution. (R. 707) Since April 1, 1985, R.O.A. has failed and
refused to pay to Webb either the Base Compensation or the Additional Compensation
set forth in the Agreement. (R. 691)
9.

R.O.A. first took the position that it owes Webb nothing under the

Agreement in this lawsuit. Since the moratorium on Webb's compensation, R.O.A. has
consistently accrued his compensation as a long-term debt obligation of R.O.A on its
unaudited and audited financial statements. (R. 710-751) These financial statements
have been approved as accurate by the board of directors and by Reagan, as president
of R.O.A.
10.

In a letter addressed to the board of directors of R.O.A., dated March

13, 1985, R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated:
I would say that in the immediate future the company has no alternative but
for me to loan it $120,000 by noon Friday. However, I am only interested in
doing so if I know the $120,000 will be paid back immediately over the next
five to six months. The company cannot do so if it continues to make
payments on Roland's and my employment agreement on a current basis and
I am suspicious that we may have the same problem again with one of the
subsequent quarters.
(R. at 754)
11.

In a letter addressed to William Reagan, dated March 27, 1985, Webb

stated:
It has become obvious to me that some drastic changes must take place if we
are to survive as a viable entity. Even though a postponement has been
placed on all management salaries, I do not believe this is the total answer to
the company's solvency.
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The very fact that the company cannot pay salaries to management
puts them in violation of management contracts and makes them subject to
litigation. Secondly, the obligation is still there, and must be paid sooner or
later.
(R. at 759)
12.

In a responsive letter addressed to Dennis Webb (Roland Webb's son),

dated July 1, 1985, R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated:
In regard to your statement that there has been a default on [Roland Webb's]
agreements, basically I feel this is a strained interpretation of what has been a
temporary moratorium . . . .
(R. at 773)
13.

In a letter addressed to Webb, dated September 18, 1985, R.O.A.,

through William Reagan, its president, stated:
I would estimate that within 12 months we should be able to accumulate the
$310,000 required to satisfy the board resolution so that we can recommence
payments under our management agreement.
(R. at 780)
14.

In a letter addressed to Roland Webb, dated February 18, 1986,

R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated:
That we meet in late March after we have made, or have not made, the
March 15 interest payment to Mass Mutual with Roland, Duane, Dennis,
Norm, and me to discuss the following items: . . . 2) what amount, through
judicious planning and careful budgeting, can the company pay to Roland on
a monthly basis in the form of management fees and/or for the purchase of
his stock?
(R. at 784)
15.

In a letter addressed to Roland Webb, dated May 16, 1986, R.O.A.,

through William Reagan, its president, stated:
I attributed the value to Palmer [Outdoor Advertising] of approximately
$1,700,000, and the other stock, employment agreement, management fees,
and other obligations of R.O.A. to Roland of $500,000. I have discounted the
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accrued management fees because of the fact that they will be turned from
ordinary income to capital gains. . . .
(R. at 791)
16.

In a letter addressed to Roland and Bessie Webb dated July 18, 1986,

R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated:
As a follow-up to our luncheon conversation the other day in regard to the
disposition of your interest in Reagan Outdoor Advertising and the resolution
of your employment agreement, it is my understanding that you will come
forward with some proposal. . . . I would estimate the total indebtedness of
the company at this time to be somewhere in the $9,000,000 to $9,440,000
range, consisting predominantly of $7,000,000 to Mass Mutual and refinance
the prepayment penalty of $800,000. There is approximately $360,000 to you,
and approximately $1,000,000 to me. . . .
(R. at 793) (emphasis added)
17.

In its Answer to Webb's complaint, R.O.A. has claimed, for the first

time, that no compensation is owed Webb under the Agreement because Webb
allegedly breached the Agreement. (R. 693) Yet even after this action was filed,
R.O.A. continued to make token payments and, in a letter addressed to Webb dated
August 4, 1987, R.O.A., through its officer, Norman Clark, stated:
Enclosed are the June, 1987, financial statements in the preliminary July sales
figures.
One thing you should note is the fact that these statements reflect your
management fees but do not reflect [William Reagan's]. His have been noted
in the audit reports as footnotes rather than on the statements themselves.
(R. at 787)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It was undisputed in the proceedings below that Webb and R.O.A. entered
into a valid and binding employment agreement. It was further undisputed that since
April 1, 1985, R.O.A. has accrued on its books (as reflected in its audited financial
statements) the compensation payable to Webb under the Agreement. It was further
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undisputed that in correspondence between the parties, R.O.A. consistently
acknowledged Webb^s right to receive the accrued compensation and, until this suit was
filed, has never claimed that Webb breached the Agreement. R.O.A.'s assertions of
breach of the Agreement are inconsistent with the clear language of the Agreement
and the corporate records of R.O.A.
The lower court properly refused to consider extrinsic parole evidence
submitted by Reagan to vary the terms of the Agreement. R.O.A. does not assert that
any of the terms of the Agreement are ambiguous. The Agreement is the final,
integrated contract of the parties.
Webb did not waive any right to receive his compensation under the
Agreement. He made repeated demands on R.O.A. and on Reagan that it be paid.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I:
A.

R.O.A.'s Numerous and Uncontroverted Admissions of Liability Are
Sufficient to Warrant Summary Judgment.
The Financial Statements of R.O.A. Constitute Uncontroverted
Admissions by R.O.A. of the Validity of Webb's Claims for Accrued
Compensation.

As a general rule, the financial statements of a corporation are admissions by
the corporation of the truth of matters contained therein. Woodstock Enterprises, Inc.
v. International Mooring and Marine, Inc., 524 So.2d 1313, 1321 (La. App.
1988) (information contained in corporation's financial statements constitutes admission
against interest); In re Marriage of Brooks, 742 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App.
1987)(financial statements constitute admissions against interest); see also Utah R.
Evidence 801(d)(2). Wigmore on Evidence provides: ,f[I]n ordinary actions for the
price of goods or services, the opponent's account book entries are of course receivable
as admissions against himself." 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 1073 (Chadbourne Rev.
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1972). This is true whether the financial statements are prepared by the company's
own accountants or by an independent firm hired by the company to perform such
duties. Id; see Courtney v. Courtney. 542 P.2d 164, 167 (Alaska 1975)(use of financial
statement in loan application is an admission); see also Falker v. Samperi, 461 A.2d
681, 688 (Conn. 1983)(use of independent survey is adoptive admission); Oxley v.
Linton Plywood Ass'n, 284 P.2d 767, 776 (Ore. 1955)(use of survey in registration
statement is an admission of facts contained therein).
The audited and unaudited financial statements of R.O.A. disclose accrued
compensation payable to Webb. The audited financial statement of R.O.A. for the
year ended July 31, 1986 (the end of the employment term), reveals the following:
Amount owed to Roland Webb, which
will not be paid within one year as
a result of the moratorium placed
on payments to officers by the Board
of Directors - See Note H.

$353,757

Note H to the July 31, 1986 audited financial statement states:
NOTE H - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES:
REAGAN

WEBB

Unpaid Balance Accrued @ 7/31/85
Prior Year Accrual Paid During Year
Amount Earned During Current Year
Current Year Earnings Paid

$

-0-0-0-0-

$ 213,341
(2,255)
142,671
-0-

Balance Accrued and Unpaid @ 7/31/86

$

-0-

$ 353 J57

These audited financial statements were addressed and delivered to each of
the stockholders and directors of R.O.A. As of June 30, 1987, one year after this
lawsuit began, the unaudited financial statements of R.O.A. continued to show an
account payable to Webb for outstanding management fees. Even Norman Clark's
affidavit, filed by R.O.A. in opposition to summary judgment, admits that R.O.A. owes
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Webb $343,570.39, which is more than the $342,747 requested by Webb in the lower
court. (R. 878, 880) These financial statements have never been challenged, amended
or modified by R.O.A. and R.O.A. has never questioned the compensation owed to
Webb until Webb filed this action to recover it.
The courts that have addressed similar fact situations have consistently
required parties to abide by their own financial statements concerning debts owed and
have found such evidence sufficient to support summary judgment. Buxton v.
Diversified Resources Corporation, 634 F.2d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 1980)(debt shown on
financial statement is sufficient for summary judgment that debt is owed). In City of
Houston v. Moody, 572 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), for example, the Texas
Court of Appeals rejected the city's argument that general obligation bonds were not
valid, concluding that ,f[t]he 1959 contract, the minutes of the . . . board meeting, and
the testimony of Mr. Moody [the holder], and continued reference to the debts in the
audits and financial statements of the District are all evidence of Mr. Binnion's [the
president's] authority to bind the District."
In Tyler Gilman Corp. v. Williams, 221 S.E.2d 129, 130 (Vir. 1976), an action
brought by the personal representative of a shareholder seeking to enforce a
promissory note against the corporation, the personal representative offered as evidence
of the indebtedness a financial statement of the corporation, addressed to the board of
directors and stockholders, which included the following: "Nc5te payable, A.T. Gilman
$40,000." The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision allowing the
claim, stating:
[T]he statement was formally addressed to the corporation's stockholders and
directors. Mrs. Gilman was one of the corporation's two stockholders and
one of its directors. She could hardly be termed a stranger with respect to
the information contained in the statement concerning indebtedness owed her.

-9-

Id. at 131. The court observed that the corporation's liability on the note "was never
questioned" until suit was brought. Id. at 130-31.
In Stee v. "L" Monte Industries. Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1976), Stee, an
engineer, introduced the financial statement of the corporation, prepared by
independent accountants, showing an account payable of $8,503.98 to Stee for services.
In upholding Stee's claim, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "'L' Monte,
through its accountants, established on January 31, 1973, that the sum owed Stee was
$8,503.98. Neither 'L' Monte nor Boehm [its president] can now be heard to complain
that the amount of the fee was uncertain on February 1, 1973." Id. at 646; see also,
Manlin v. Manlin, 638 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo. App. 1982)(financial statement entries are
admissions against interest).
B.

Undisputed Correspondence Between R.O.A. and Webb Constitute
Further Admissions by R.O.A. of the Validity of Webb's claim for
Accrued Compensation.

The numerous letters that passed between R.O.A. and Webb since 1985
consistently confirmed R.O.A.'s obligation to Webb for the amount of the accrued
management fees. R.O.A. never questioned Webb's right to receive the amounts called
for under the Agreement. As of July 18, 1986, R.O.A. acknowledged that it owed
Webb "approximately $360,000." (R. 793) By letter to Webb dated August 4, 1987,
after the commencement of this action, R.O.A. stated, "One thing that you should note
is the fact that these [financial] statements reflect your management fees but do not
reflect Bill's." (R. 787)
These letters constitute further express admissions that Webb's accrued
management fees are valid obligations of R.O.A. Nowhere, either in the lower court
or on appeal, has R.O.A. attempted to dispute, or even explain, the repeated
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acknowledgments in its financial statements and correspondence of Webb's entitlement
to his accrued management fees.
C.

R.O.A.'s Contention That Webb Did Not Work Sufficient Hours to
Earn His Salary Fails to Controvert the Record and Ignores the
Express Terms of the Employment Agreement.

R.O.A.'s argument that Webb worked less than 40 hours per week and
therefore was in breach of the Agreement cannot be taken seriously. The Agreement
only required him to devote from 50% to 5% of his time to R.O.A. R.O.A.'s
argument that Webb spent time working on personal matters is also insufficient to
avoid summary judgment. The Agreement specifically allowed Webb to work on
personal matters (R. 700) and there is no evidence in the Record that Webb's personal
matters interfered with Webb's work for R.O.A. Reagan's assertions of breach are not
relevant because Webb was only answerable to the board of directors, not to Reagan
personally. At no time, either in the financial statements, the correspondence or the
minutes of the board of directors has there ever been any indication that Webb was in
breach of his employment contract.
POINT II:

Parole Evidence is Inadmissible to Change the Terms of the
Employment Agreement.

A.

The Terms of the Agreement Are Not Ambiguous.

R.O.A. goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate why the employment
agreement means something other than what it says. However, a simple review of the
Agreement confirms that the District Court correctly refused to consider extrinsic
evidence offered by R.O.A. to vary the terms of the Agreement. It is unquestionably
the law in Utah that if R.O.A. intends to vary the terms of a written contract, it must
demonstrate an ambiguity in the Agreement.

ff

[0]nly where the language is uncertain

and ambiguous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to." Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248,
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1251 (Utah 1980). The ambiguity must appear on the face of the document itself.
"When a contract is clear on its face, extrinsic or parol evidence is generally not
admissible to explain the intent of the contract." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
In Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court held, "It is only when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by
an objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that resort may
be had to the use of extrinsic evidence."

Id. at 1062; see Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nafl

Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987)("If the contract language is ambiguous or
uncertain after careful consideration of the whole integration, only then should a court
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent.").
R.O.A. did not argue in the lower court and does not argue in this appeal
that any of the terms of the Agreement are ambiguous. The reason is obvious; the
contract could not have been drafted any clearer. R.O.A. cannot create an ambiguity
in the Agreement simply by straining the language to add terms and conditions not
present. With regard to finding an ambiguity in a contract the Utah Supreme Court
has stated, '"That requirement is not satisfied because a party may get a different
meaning by placing a forced or strained construction on it in accordance with his
interest. The test to be applied is: would the meaning be plain to a person of ordinary
intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance
with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in light of the
circumstances . . . ."' Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 896
(Utah 1988)(quoting Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.. 27 Utah 2d 169,
493 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1972)). "Contract terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply
because one party seeks to endow them with a different meaning than that relied on by
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the drafter." Id. at 895 (citations omitted); see Jones v. Hinckle, 611 P.2d 733, 735
(Utah 1980)("Contract provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that
the parties urge diverse interpretations.").
B. The Employment Agreement Was Integrated.
R.O.A. attempts to circumvent the parole evidence rule's restriction on
extrinsic evidence by stating that, because terms were missing, the contract was not
integrated.7 R.O.A. has failed to offer any evidence that the parties did not intend the
Agreement to be the final, complete understanding of the parties at the time it was
executed. The Agreement was a formal contract drafted by legal counsel to govern a
five-year employment relationship involving large sums of money. R.O.A. has
presented no evidence that the Agreement was only preliminary to a more final

1

In doing so R.O.A. violates the integration rule established by the cases cited in
its own brief. Under this rule, only evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the contract is admissible to determine whether the contract is "integrated"
and represents the final, complete agreement of the parties. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972). Evidence concerning the parties'
intent under the terms of the contract is not admissible on the issue of integration. . "In
determining the issue of the completeness of the integration of writing, extrinsic
evidence to the writing is inadmissible. Parole testimony is admissible to show the
circumstances under which the agreement was made . . . ." Id. As stated by Williston
on Contracts:
If we may go outside the instrument to prove that there was a
stipulation not contained in it, and so that only part of the contract
was put in writing, and then because of that fact, enforce the oral
stipulation, there will be little value left in the [parole evidence] rule
itself.
Williston on Contracts, § 633, p. 1016 (1961). The evidence offered by R.O.A. on
integration consisted of statements by Reagan to the effect that R.O.A. must have
sufficient cash available to it before the 1% gross sales provision would be paid to
Webb. (Appellants' Brief at 5, R. 883)
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agreement. There can be no question that the Agreement is the final understanding of
the parties.
Long ago the Utah Supreme Court resolved this issue, stating "The rule is
well-settled that, where the parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a
complete and certain agreement, it will, in the absence of fraud, be conclusively
presumed that the writing contained the whole of the agreement between the parties,
that it is a complete memorial of such agreement, and that parol evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements will not be received for
the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of the written document." B.T. Moran,
Inc. v. First Security Corp., 82 Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384, 389 (1933).
G

The Intent of the Parties is Clear from the Face of the Agreement.

R.O.A.'s construction of the Agreement is not only inadmissible, it is
unreasonable. Certainly no minority shareholder would condition receiving his salary
on sufficient money being available to pay it. Accepting R.O.A.'s interpretation would
essentially strip Webb of a large part of his accrued compensation. "[W]here there is a
choice, an interpretation which will bring about an equitable result will be preferred
over a harsh or inequitable one." Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah
1972)(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has, in the past, wisely stated that
courts "will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted." Hal
Taylor Ass, v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982)(citing Tomino v.
Greater Park City Co., 570 P.2d 698 (Utah 1977).
POINT III:

Webb Did Not Waive His Right to Receive Compensation Under the
Agreement.

The correspondence between the parties and the minutes of the board of
directors of R.O.A. are replete with demands by Webb to receive his compensation.
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Webb voted against the moratorium on salaries instituted by Reagan but, as a minority
shareholder, was rebuffed by Reagan. As aptly stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in
the prior appeal of this case: "Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known
right. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 431 (Utah 1983). 'It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied.' Id. (quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Blomquist 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968))." Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc.,
773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah App. 1989).
CONCLUSION
The uncontroverted facts and the legal authorities discussed above
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that:
1)

Webb and R.O.A. entered into a valid and binding employment

agreement which represented the complete understanding of the parties;
2)

R.O.A. has breached the employment agreement by failing to pay to

Webb the compensation required by the agreement; and
3)

R.O.A. has repeatedly acknowledged that Webb's compensation under

the agreement is due and owing to Webb in the amount of $342,747.
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the judgment by the
lower court ordering R.O.A. to pay to Webb the accrued employment compensation
pursuant to the Agreement.
DATED this /3$

day of October, 1989.
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE

By: ^/Z^e*^

drftofa^

SttTpheli M. TumbliTT
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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